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Chapter One 
The Politics of Identification in 
Waiting for Godot 
Graley Herren 
1956 Hungary, 1957 San Quentin, 1976 Johannesburg, 1980 Cape Town, 
1984 Haifa, 1992 Quebec, 1993 Sarajevo, 2007 New Orleans. Coming soon 
to a locked-down, bombed-out, banned, segregated, or flooded theater near 
you: Waiting for Godot. But why Godot? A play that begins with the line, 
"Nothing to be done" (11) and concludes both of its acts in abject paralysis 
["They do not move" (52, 88)], hardly recommends itself as a lightning rod 
for political activism. Nevertheless, throughout the production history of the 
play it has frequently been revived at times of social upheaval before suffer-
ing audiences who long for deliverance, and who see their suffering and 
longing reflected back at them by Waiting/or Godot. 
For a play that goes nowhere, it has remained constantly on the move. 
Godot recently had its passport stamped and its political credentials renewed 
in a highly acclaimed 2007 New Orleans production, produced enviromnen-
tally in neighborhoods still ravaged by Hurricane Katrina. Artist and activist 
Paul Chan, who conceived the project, recalls his original inspiration for this 
site-specific production. 
Friends said the city now looks like the backdrop for a bleak science fiction 
movie. Waiting for a ride to pick me up after visiting with some Common 
Ground volunteers who were gutting houses in the Lower Ninth, I realized it . 
didn't look like a movie set, but the stage for a play I have seen many times. It 
was unmistakable. The empty road. The bare tree leaning precariously to one 
side with just enough leaves to make it respectable. The silence. [ ... ] It was 
uncanny. Standing there at the intersection of North Prieur and Reynes, I 
suddenly formd myself in the middle of Samuel Beckett's Waiting/or Godot. 
(2) 
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Chan teamed up with two New York-based arts groups-Creative Time pro-
ductions (best known for the "Towers of Light" memorial at Ground Zero) 
and the Classical Theatre of Harlem (who had just mounted a production of 
Godot in 2006) to stage two weekends' worth of free public shows in No-
vember 2007, first at a crossroads in the Lower Ninth Ward, and then at a 
destroyed house in Gentilly. 1 The project might easily have been dismissed 
as a carpetbagger enterprise, especially since these New York artists eventu-
ally left town with a book contract and a documentary film deal already 
secured. However, Chan was scrupulous from the start to involve local resi-
dents, artists, and activists, and to establish a "shadow fund" through which 
every dollar spent on the production was matched by donations earmarked 
specifically for relief efforts in the Lower Ninth and Gentilly. It seems that 
the production team scored a rare trifecta: embraced by the locals, lauded by 
the popular press, and ignored by the Beckett estate2 and other orthodox 
Beckettian purists, who normally do not miss a chance to excommunicate 
heretical productions like this stageless, cross-racial Godot. 
I certainly would not count myself among the purists, 3 and I have no 
vested interest in either endorsing or denouncing Chan & Company. My 
interest lies in trying to understand the counterintuitive yet persistent political 
allure of Waiting for Godot. What is it about this play that so frequently 
attracts producers to stage it in volatile political environments? In what ways 
does the play support political appropriation, and in what ways does it resist, 
frustrate or undermine such designs? Jon Erickson grapples with some of 
these fundamental questions in a recent article for Modern Drama, "Is Noth-
ing To Be Done?" There he provides a useful working definition of the term 
"political": "The political is a means toward an end, and the end for those in 
democratic societies is an ethical one, related to the amelioration or ending of 
suffering andthe flourishing of the good" (259). Does Waiting/or Godot, as 
written or performed, in fact work as a means toward the ends of ameliorat-
ing suffering and encouraging "the good" to flourish? Can a production of 
the play be employed effectively in pursuit of such ends, regardless of what 
Beckett may or may not have intended? The present essay turns for answers 
not only to Beckett's primary text and to scholarly exegesis, but also to two 
remarkably different but equally engaged Godot productions: the aforemen-
tioned 2007 New Orleans production, and the 1993 Sarajevo production 
conceived and directed by the late Susan Sontag. 
1. WAITING FOR CLINTON: GODOT FOR AND ABOUT 
SARAJEVO 
ln the sununer of 1993, amid constant Serbian bombardments, American art 
critic, novelist and intellectual iconoclast Susan Sontag made a highly publi-
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cized trip to Sarajevo to direct Waiting for Godot. She had visited the war-
torn city before, but this time she was resolved to make a more meaningful 
contribution: "I couldn't again be just a witness: that is, meet and visit, 
tremble with fear, feel brave, feel depressed, have heartbreaking conversa-
tions, grow ever more indignant, lose weight. If I went back, it would be to 
pitch in and do something" (299). Interestingly, her description of what con-
stitutes an inappropriate response to crisis sounds precisely like the behavior 
modeled by Vladimir and Estragon in Godot. Nonetheless, Sontag chose not 
to waste her time in idle discourse but instead to act upon her ethical impulse 
to ameliorate the suffering of Sarajevans. She humbly conceded, "I was not 
under the illusion that going to Sarajevo to direct a play would make me 
useful in the way I could be ifl were a doctor or a water systems engineer. It 
would be a small contribution. But it was the only one of the three things I 
do-write, make films, and direct in the theatre-which yields something 
that would exist only in Sarajevo, that would be made and consumed there" 
(300). Of course, Sontag's larger agenda was considerably more ambitious 
than "a small contribution" for the theatrical consumers of the beleaguered 
city. ln acting locally, she was clearly thinking globally, seeking to attract 
increased international attention to the Bosnian plight and using her moment 
in the spotlight to lobby for military intervention against the intensifying 
genocide. During rehearsals, Sontag recalled, "The cast and I tried to avoid 
jokes about 'waiting for Clinton,' but that was very much what we were 
doing in late July ( ... ]. Although people were afraid to hope, for fear of 
being disappointed, at the same time no one could believe that Clinton would 
again speak of intervention and do nothing" (314-315). 
Sontag's political agenda could presumably have been served by any 
number of plays. Yet, from the beginning, her idea was not to produce just 
any spectacle for the suffering Sarajevans, but specifically to enlist Beckett's 
classic to aid the cause. Why Godot? "Beckett's play," explained Sontag, 
"seems written for, and about, Sarajevo" (300). To her credit, Sontag appears 
to have been cognizant of the fact that Beckett offers no panacea of political 
solution in the play, nor did she wish to force-feed her audience bromides of 
false hope: "Culture, serious culture, is an expression of human dignity-
which is what people in Sarajevo feel they have lost, even when they know 
themselves to be brave, or stoical, or angry. For they also know themselves to 
be terminally weak: waiting, hoping, not wanting to hope, knowing that they 
aren't going to be saved" (304). Despair-over the futility of hope, the inevi-
tability of suffering and the impossibility of salvation-casts a pall over 
Waiting for Godot from start to fmish. As Jon Erickson bleakly observes of 
the play, "Suffering, whether of the New Testament poor or of the contempo-
rary proletariat, is not redeemed here, certaiuly not by any human effort (and, 
in light of what one assumes to be Beckett's belief, not by anything else 
either)" (261). Estragon has resigned any faith he may once have had that 
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things will ever get better: "Nothing to be done," he complains on two 
occasions (I 1, 22), as well as conceding, "Don't let's do anything. It's safer" 
(19), "No use struggling" (22), and "Nothing we can do about it" (24)-all 
within the first fifteen minutes of the play. Vladimir, on the other hand, still 
behaves as if help might be forthcoming, though his ragged hope now seems 
more a habit than a genuine gesture of faith: "I'm beginning to come round to 
that opinion," he responds to Estragon's opening resignation. "All my life 
I've tried to put it from me, saying, Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven't yet 
tried everything. And I resumed the struggle" (11). He is the impetus behind 
continuing to wait for Godot, continuing to wait for meaning behind or 
redemption from their suffering. But a half century of unrewarded hope is 
enough to shake anyone's faith. "I can't go on!" cries Vladimir late in the 
play, even though he reaffirms his intention to do just that in the play's 
closing exchange. 
From the beginning, Didi and Gogo have already reached the abject im-
passe of the "terminally weak" that Sontag ascribes to Saraj evans by the 
sunnner of 1993, and nothing happens (twice) by the play's termination to 
substantially reverse that condition. One might well ask what possible ethical 
good could come from showing a desolate play to a population already 
thoroughly desolated before the show goes on. Sontag countered that in times 
of desperation, audiences do not necessarily hunger for escapist pap to help 
them easily digest their plight: "It's not true that what everyone wants is 
entertainment that offers them an escape from their own reality. In Sarajevo, 
as anywhere else, there are more than a few people who feel strengthened 
and consoled by having their sense of reality affirmed and transfigured by 
art" (301-302). 
In sum, then, Sontag professed that Waiting for Godot was worth per-
forming at this time and in this place because the people of Sarajevo needed 
to witness an "expression of human dignity" that "strengthened and con-
soled" them as it "affirmed and transfigured" their "terminally weak" sense 
ofreal hopelessness. But how can a group's collective sense ofreality be at 
once "affmned" and "transfigured"? If it is affirmed, then what need is there 
for transfiguration? If transfigured, then doesn't the resulting new sense of 
reality displace rather than affirm the original? This apparent contradiction is 
no mere semantic quibble; for no sooner did Sontag select Godot for its 
affirmative relevance-"Beckett's play ( ... ] seems written for, and about, 
Sarajevo" (300)-than she set about radically transfiguring the performance 
into something very different than the play Beckett wrote. Given the ex-
tremely difficult and dangerous conditions in which she and her cast were 
, working, and conceding that her guiding motives were more political than 
aesthetic, it would be prudish in the first instance and profoundly beside the 
point in the second instance to hold Sontag's production to punctilious stan-
dards of fidelity. That being said, it is difficult to reconcile Sontag's cham-
~-
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pionship of Waiting for Godot as the ideal mirror for the Sarajevan crisis on 
the one hand, with her cavalier overhaul of Beckett's dialogue, characters, 
directions and iconography on the other. 
To be fair, some of her departures from Beckett's instructions were rela-
tively benign. For instance, she cast a woman in the role of Pozzo and a man 
in the role of Boy. Granted, such meddling with the dramatis personae had 
infamously attracted the ire of the Beckett estate on previous occasions, even 
to the point of shutting down certain high-profile productions that did not 
follow the letter of the Beckettian law. 4 However, surely most reasonable 
observers can agree that occasional casting departures by a director from the 
race, sex or age of a character as originally conceived by the playwright can 
be both a practical necessity and a portal of discovery for new interpretive 
possibilities. Had Sontag confined her revisions to provocative new ap-
proaches to casting, then her aesthetic interventions would have fallen well 
within the reasonable bounds of creative license. 
Sontag reconfigured the play far more radically, however, when she chose 
to triple the central couple. The Sarajevo production featured three separate 
Vladimirs and Estragons on stage simultaneously-a central male couple, 
flanked by two women on one side and an elderly man and woman on the 
other. By way of explanation, Sontag merely noted, "there was no reason not 
to use what Beckett envisaged, two men, at the center; but they would be 
flanked on the left side of the stage by two women and on the right by a 
woman and a man-three variations on the theme of the couple" (306). Her 
initial concession sounds ahnost as if she were doing the playwright a favor 
by actually retaining some semblance of the play he wrote, even as she 
invented entirely new characters and scenarios for a production still billing 
itself as Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot. By tripling Vladimir and Estra-
gon, Sontag takes an audacious liberty that works against the fundamental 
premise of the play. The couple's isolation is essential to their condition. It 
explains why they have become so codependent upon one another, and it 
accounts for their bewilderment when confronted with the novelty of Pozzo 
and Lucky. Furthermore, the sustained analogy between Didi and Gogo and 
the two thieves crucified beside Christ is sacrificed with the tripling of the 
couples. Had Sontag elected simply to cast two women in the two primary 
roles, or an older man and woman, then either of these casting decisions 
might have been interesting and would have been at least as justifiable as the 
female Pozzo and the adult Boy. But to splice together the actions a~d di-
alogue of three Vladimirs and three Estragons seems less like an aesthetic 
experiment guided by a coherent directorial vision and more like a cloning 
experiment gone terribly wrong. 
If "there was no reason not to use what Beckett envisaged" (306), then 
was there any preferable reason, aesthetically or politically, to use instead 
what Sontag envisaged? Quite frankly, no, judging by her rationalization: "It 
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was troubling that there were more good actors available than parts, since I 
knew how much it meant to the actors I auditioned to be in the play" (305). 
Viewed purely in terms of employment opportunities, three Vladimirs are 
inarguably better than one (likewise three Hamlets, or three Hedda Gablers-
why not four?). Perhaps one should not fault Sontag too harshly for her 
humanitarian impulse to provide meaningful work for actors whose talents 
were not only chronically under-utilized during the city's bombardment but 
who were quite literally willing to risk their lives in order to participate in her 
production. And on some level it is understandable that she might have felt a 
greater sense of obligation to collaborate with the men and women working 
alongside her than to keep scrupulous faith with the late Beckett's text. 5 
Nevertheless, generosity and solidarity notwithstanding, to reduce Wait-
ing/or Godot to the function of employment agency-radically revising the 
play not in an attempt to enhance its expression of human dignity or to 
interrogate its terminal weakness so much as to avoid making difficult cast-
ing cuts among actors who needed a job-is to make a travesty of this or any 
other play. The honor of enlisting Waiting for Godot in the service of suffer-
ing Sarajevans, only to fundamentally misrepresent the play to the very audi-
ences it was designed to affirm, is dubious at best. Beckett scholar Lois 
Oppenheim was not alone in suspecting that "her decision to bring Godot to 
the former Yugoslavia was not so much about Sarajevo as about Sontag" and 
that "the Sarajevo production was not what Sontag claimed it to be, 'a way of 
[pitching] in and [doing] something,' but motivated, rather, by narcissism 
masquerading as martyrdom, or at the very least, altruism" ( 41 ). 
Unfortunately, Sontag's altruistic interventions included not only multi-
plication of the cast but also subtraction of the text. Over the course of the 
grueling rehearsals, she discovered that her mutated version of Godot was 
running considerably longer than traditional productions. With her addition 
of four cloned characters, the first act alone was clocking in at ninety min-
utes. Even with a "paired down" second act (in which she deigned to include 
only one Didi and one Gogo ), the performance was approaching three hours' 
duration. This realization finally began to trouble Sontag's scruples-over 
her audience's discomfort: "They would be hot, since it was high summer, 
and they would be squeezed together; I knew that many more people would 
be lining up outside the stage door for each performance than could be seated 
(tickets are free). How could I ask the audience, which would have no lobby, 
bathroom, or water, to sit so uncomfortably, without moving, for two and a 
half hours?" (312) To her mind, these unacceptable conditions necessitated a 
drastic solution: "I concluded that I could not do all of Waiting for Godot. 
But the very choices I had made about the staging which made Act I as long 
as it was also meant that the staging could represent the whole of Waiting for 
Godot, while using only the words of Act I" (312). Therefore, motivated by 
her altruistic desire to extend employment to as many actors as possible, 
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Sontag radically distorted the play; then, once she realized that this distortion 
yielded an excessively long first act, rather than abandoning her first mistake, 
she compounded it with a second, jettisoning the entire second act of the 
play. "This is awful!" (59), as Vladimir protests in act II-{)r would have 
done, had Sontag allowed her audience to hear. these words, rather than 
erasing half of the play "written for, and about, Sarajevo." 
To her grave discredit, Sontag admitted that there were deeper concerns 
than heat and duration behind her decision to excise the second act: "Perhaps 
I felt that the despair of act I was enough for the Sarajevo audience, and I 
wanted to spare them a second time when Godot does not arrive. Maybe I 
wanted to propose, subliminally, that act II might be different" (313). The 
contradiction at the heart of Sontag's project is laid bare in this danming 
admission, where she confesses to knowingly and willingly violating the 
spirit of the play. She purportedly selected Godot for its unflinching stoicism, 
its refusal to opt for easy escapism, its affirmation of Sarajevans' "terminally 
weak'' sense of reality: "waiting, hoping, not wanting to hope, knowing that 
they aren't going to be saved" (304). And yet, in what must be regarded at 
best as an act of bad faith and at worst as deliberate censorship, she withheld 
Beckett's reiteration of despair in act II, ostensibly "sparing" her spectators, 
but in fact sparing herself, while selling both her audience and the play short. 
Jon Erickson argues that one of the key accomplishments of Waiting for 
Godot is Beckett's achievement of a compatible form to accommodate mean-
inglessness: 
[ ... ] in pointing to the meaninglessness of existence, Beckett couldn't give us 
a formless play, in which the dialogue goes nowhere and is completely arbi-
trary, and expect us to understand the suffering that meaninglessness entails 
for humans who want answers. Instead, we are, given form, form with a ven-
geance-a form that promises meaning but denies it also in--its very form. 
Instead of a hermeneutic circle, we are given a vicious one. Instead of the 
promise of progress, the threat of infinite regress. The symmetry of the two-act 
Waiting for Godot-necessary to depict time's passing, a third act superflu-
ous-is both an aesthetic pleasure and its ultimate frustration. (267) 
Erickson goes on to characterize the second act beautifully as a reiterated 
moment of suspension, "the moment of hope's exquisite suffering in trying 
not to hope" (267). By robbing the play of its symmetry and hedging its 
~opelessness, Sontag cheapened the play and her audience's theatrical expe-
nence. 
Then again, "trying not to hope" is precisely what political activists at-
tempt not to do. Despite her righteous anger and palpable frustration over 
"the absence of any political will to end this suffering" (321), Sontag obvi-
ously believed that it was better to "pitch in and do something" rather than 
continuing to wait passively like Didi and Gogo. To the extent that she saw 
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their passivity reflected in the despair of Sarajevans or in the paralysis of 
world leaders, she sought to shatter that mirror. Remember that Sontag 
claimed, "In Sarajevo, as anywhere else, there are more than a few people 
who feel strengthened and consoled by having their sense ofreality affirmed 
and transfigured by art" (302). Yet wherever the play threatened to acquiesce 
in or affirm acceptance of suffering, she intervened through directorial trans-
figuration, "flipping the script" and subverting its message. As we have seen, 
she tripled the primary couple, thus replacing the isolation of act I with a 
community of shared suffering; and rather than allow' the play to complete a 
vicious circle of despair, she eliminated act II altogether. Though she claimed 
to have chosen Waiting for Godot for its unique relevance to Sarajevo, her 
production tells a different story, a story about a play that wasn't relevant 
enough and needed political correction through artistic transfiguration. It is 
as if she wanted to stage an aesthetic intervention that modeled the military 
intervention she hoped for from NATO. If Susan Sontag could save Waiting 
for Godot from Samuel Beckett's despair, then perhaps there was still hope 
that Clinton and comrades could save Sarajevo from Bosnian genocide. 
2. MIRRORS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY 
Sontag's 1993 Sarajevo production appeared at an anxious turning point in 
"the Beckett Circle"-that cantankerous cadre of friends, performers, fellow 
writers, devoted collaborators, theater critics, academics, and defenders 
(most self-appointed) of Beckett's best interests. In the years immediately 
following Beckett's death in 1989, people passionately interested in his work 
were scrambling to orient themselves to the new post-Beckett realities. Not 
surprisingly, given Beckett's own proprietary concerns over productions of 
his work during his life, performances staged after his death provided a 
contentious battleground on which Beckett's posthumous authority was 
tested. Without Himself around to direct his own plays, or to instruct others 
in doing so, or to bestow or withhold his imprimatur on a given production, 
we Beckettians spent a good deal of energy and spilled massive quantities of 
ink fretting over "What Would Beckett Do?" Entering the fray at this particu-
lar juncture, Sontag served as a convenient target for scorn, given the extrav-
agant excesses of her heresies against Beckett's most sacred text. Consider 
for instance Lois Oppenheim, who craftily couched her objections to Sontag 
in the form of a question that answers itself in the asking: "Can the interpre-
tation of art, such as the director's interpretation of a play [ .... ] make suffi-
cient difference to justify a misrepresentation of the artist's or playwright's 
primary intentions, or is such misrepresentation merely reckless and falsify-
ing and hence without real justification?" (40) Either way, it would seem, 
Sontag is guilty of misrepresentation. But why single out Oppenheim, when 
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my own disapproval is scarcely concealed in the preceding assessment of the 
production. Sontag's deviations are so brazen that it is tempting for commen-
tary to devolve into a duel to hoist her upon the pithiest petard. Meanwhile, 
the legitimate political stakes raised by Waiting for Godot can easily get 
obscured amid the bluster. In truth, I suspect that many Beckett critics would 
have been equally uneasy with a perfectly faithful rendition of the play, on 
the grounds that performing Godot in 1993 Sarajevo (or for that matter in 
2007 New Orleans) necessarily distorts the play insofar as it involves con-
scripting Beckett as spokesperson for one side against another in a local 
political imbroglio. In other words, the tired arguments over authorial inten-
tion and textual infidelity may serve as smokescreens for deeper concerns 
over political appropriation and identification. 
Elin Diamond locates the source of this tension in the play itself when she 
characterizes Waiting for Godot as a "parable on the problematic of identifi-
cation" (38). According to Diamond, identification-the phenomenon most 
influentially described by Jacques Lacan in the "mirror stage" of ego forma-
tion6-is the cracked looking-glass in which all political relations are falsely 
reflected. "With their basis in false images, identificatory fantasies elide the 
reality of the other's difference, tum the other into a semblance of(my)self' 
(39). When extended to the political arena, this false equation of self and 
other invites one of two strategies, both considered dangerously distorted by 
Diamond: "An imaginary nonrational psychic process, identification pro-
duces, in the political realm, a crude, potentially violent division between 
those who are like me and those who are 'other'; those who are 'healthy' and 
those who sicken the body politic and must be destroyed" (39-40). In other 
words, politics at its most benign invites solidarity-Let's all just get along, 
fostering umty by ignoring difference-while politics at its most malignant 
threatens extermination-If you are not with Us you are against Us and must 
either be converted or eliminated. Either way, the "identificatory fantasy" is 
false, premised upon an "imaginary nonratiollal psychic process." Consid-
ered in these terms, Waiting for Godot does indeed offer trenchant political 
commentary, argues Diamond, but not the kind that producers typically bar-
gain for when they enlist the play to serve their specific causes. "What is 
political in Godot," she asserts, "is not the real suffering it mirrors but the 
oppressive effects of identification's mirror relations and the impossibility of 
a politics that necessarily derives from them. For Beckett politics is not 
unaesthetic; it's impossible." Politics is impossible because it "operates not 
in spite of but through the imaginary" ( 40), and any understanding of imagi-
nary identification as inherently irrational must necessarily reject such a 
misguided effort out of hand as foredoomed. 
Diamond does detect a viable alternative to identification offered in Go-
dot, albeit on the more modest interpersonal level. She argues that Vladimir 
and Estragon's "duologues are more than the time-passing antics of existen-
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dot, albeit on the more modest interpersonal level. She argues that Vladimir 
and Estragon's "duologues are more than the time-passing antics of existen-
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tial clowns; they are exercises in negotiating power relations without coer-
cive identifications" ( 41 ). She notes that, for all their apparent similarities, 
"their pronounced sameness makes room for difference" so that "the couple 
do not mirror one another; no one is trapped in the other's identificatory 
fantasy" (41). For Diamond, Didi and Gogo's inability to play at being Pozzo 
and Lucky represents not a theatrical defeat but an ideological victory: "Their 
failure to achieve the norm of meaning constitutes a resistance to that norm" 
( 41 ). If politics writ large is impossible, interpersonal communication that 
resists identification and respects difference may still be viable. Diamond's 
conclusions about politics oJlas failure are consonant with Jon Erickson's 
thesis, advanced tentatively in the form of a question: "Could we say [ ... ] 
that Waiting for Godot is reflective of the limits or even failure of politics in 
human affairs?'' (259) 
This deep distrust of politics-as impossible, doomed to failure, based 
upon false premises of identification between self and other-is a signature 
of much postmodern thought, particularly in the field of ethics. Like Elin 
Diamond, Terry Eagleton turns to Lacan's "The Mirror Stage" as the para-
digmatic statement of the problem. In Trouble with Strangers: A Study of 
Ethics, Eagleton explains, 
The importance ofLacan's lecture lay in its illustration of the imaginary-that 
strange realm of the human psyche in which subjects and objects[ ... ] appear 
constantly to exchange places and live each other's lives. [ ... ] It is as though 
you can put yourself in the very place from which you are being observed, or 
see yourself at the same time from the inside and the outside. (2) 
The self's imaginary identification with the other is regarded with deep sus-
picion by the cultural left, asserts Eagleton, because the imaginary affrrms 
"unity, stasis, resemblance, correspondence, autonomy, mimesis, representa-
tion, harmony, plenitude and totality; and no terms could have been less a la 
mode for an avant-garde whose buzz words were lack, absence, difference, 
conflict, fissure, dispersal, fragmentation and heterogeneity" (5). 
A prime example of this tension can be found in the philosophy of Emma-
nuel Levinas, whom Eagleton labels "one of the earliest postmodern think-
ers." As with many of the ethicists Eagleton studies, Levinas' distrust of the 
political is rooted in twentieth-century atrocities: "His extreme wariness of 
identity and generality has its roots in a history of fascist and Stalinist barbar-
ism. For him, as for some of his postmodern progeny, there is a discernible 
patb from tbe generic to tbe Gulag" (233). When Diamond derides "the 
oppressive effects of identification's mirror relations and the impossibility of 
a politics that necessarily derives from them" ( 40), she reveals her member-
ship in the Levinas camp that perpetually sees reflections of Hitler and Stalin 
whenever gazing into the political mfiror. 
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But why Hitler and not de Gaulle? As Eagleton pointedly observes, 
"When Levinas thinks of solidarity he thinks of fascism, not of the resistance 
movements which fought to overcome it" (233). Of course, Beckett personal-
ly participated in that movement, a political coalition that ultimately pre-
vailed against the very forces that Levinas et al. oppose. By invoking the 
French Resistance as a positive example of political solidarity, Eagleton airs 
his own counter-suspicion against the anti-political thrust of postmodern eth-
ics, namely that such indiscriminate vilification of the political amounts to 
throwing the democratic baby out with the fascist bathwater. He finds a 
dangerous degree of social abnegation in the ethics of Levinas and his post-
modern progeny: "his ethical thought is among other things symptomatic of 
an era in which the whole concept of human communality has been damaged 
almost beyond repair, both by its advocates and its antagonists. At its most 
negative, it is the sign of the gradual atrophy of the sense of society. Politics 
is now the problem, not the solution" (233). Eagleton rejects this anti-politi-
cal platform in no uncertain terms: "What one might loosely call poststructu-
ralist or postmodern ethics reflects among other things a massive failure of 
political nerve on the part of a European intelligentsia confronted not only 
with the formidable power of global corporate capitalism, but still languish-
ing guiltily in the long shadow of the Gulag and the gas chambers" (233). 
Eagleton is not blind to the real abuses that can and have resulted from the 
politics of identification or from global corporate capitalism for that matter. 
Nonetheless, he challenges the notion that the only acceptable antidote to the 
disease of fascism is to erect a quarantine wall of alterity between the self 
and the other, isolating against cross-contamination. Instead, Eagleton coun-
ters simply but persuasively, "Human interaction involves identity as well as 
difference. The notion of communication is the ruin of both absolute identity 
and absolute alterity" (237). 
How then might one scale the walls of alterity to communicate with the 
other in ways that are at once practically effective and yet respectful of 
difference? On what common ground can the self and the other stand separ-
ately but together? Eagleton' s response resonates strongly with Waiting for 
Godot. Rather than positing grandiose humanist platitudes as the basis for 
political solidarity, he charts a much humbler pathway through the looking-
glass of identification: mutual abjection. 
But what if ethics and ontology were not so opposed? What if an immeasur-
able abjection were what we had in common? If the Other relates to me (<is 
abjected, traumatise~ held hostage and the like) just as I relate to him, then the 
non-relation between us, so to speak, becomes symmetrical. [ ... ] It is on the 
ground of our shared trauma [ ... ] that a free, equal and fulfilling encounter 
between us becomes possible. (23 8) 
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But what if ethics and ontology were not so opposed? What if an immeasur-
able abjection were what we had in common? If the Other relates to me (<is 
abjected, traumatise~ held hostage and the like) just as I relate to him, then the 
non-relation between us, so to speak, becomes symmetrical. [ ... ] It is on the 
ground of our shared trauma [ ... ] that a free, equal and fulfilling encounter 
between us becomes possible. (23 8) 
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Opponents of the imaginazy assume at least two things about the identificato-
ry encounter between the self and the other: I) when the self(any self) gazes 
at the other (any other) and sees reflections of himself, he is mistaken; and 2) 
not only is the self wrong in imagining similarity where there is really only 
difference, but he is willfully wrong-imagining similarity only to serve 
some nefarious end, breaching the walls of alterity in a Trojan horse of 
identification only to spring out and ultimately destroy the duped other. 
Eagleton rejects both of these assumptions. He suggests that legitimate iden-
tification is possible, and that it need not necessarily be based upon decep-
tion, manipulation or abuse of power. In fact, the shared experience of having 
been abused by those in power can serve as the common ground on which the 
self and the other stand side by side in solidarity. 
Waiting for Godot endorses no specific political program for its specta-
tors to follow, nor does it encourage faith that solutions are forthcoming from 
any sort of savior, political or otherwise. However, the play does affirm that 
empathy and communication are still possible on the very "ground of our 
shared trauma" mapped out by Eagleton. Estragon repeatedly asks Vladimir 
if they are tied to Godot. Insofar as the Pozzo/Lucky relationship mirrors the 
relationship of Godot to the tramps, the play implies that Didi and Go go are 
indeed slaves bound to their master, even if that master may be no more than 
an imaginazy figment of their own creation, and even if they have the power 
to sever those bonds if only they would acknowledge as much. However, 
they are also tied with less oppressive bonds-to one another, to Pozzo and 
Lucky, and by extension to all fellow sufferers watching the play or suffering 
outside the theater-through their shared abjection. 
All efforts at political action in the first act prove pathetic and futile. 
Vladimir and Estragon repeatedly state their commitment to doing nothing. 
With the appearance of Pozzo and Lucky, Vladimir is temporarily moved by 
an ethical impulse to protest injustice. Outraged by Lucky's cruel mistreat-
ment, he musters up the courage to object: "It's a scandal!" (28) However, 
his righteous indignation quickly subsides once he learns that Pozzo plans to 
get rid of Lucky by selling him at the market. This revelation would seem to 
invite further political outrage at Pozzo's blatant engagement in the slave 
trade. But instead, probably intuiting the analogy between Pozzo and Lucky 
and his own relationship with Godot, Vladimir shifts his concern to the 
master's abandomnent of his faithful servant. Eventually, Didi goes so far as 
to tum the tables on Lucky, blaming him for mistreating Pozzo: "How dare 
you! It's abominable! Such a good master!" (34) With Estragon, the case is 
even worse. Frrst he deprives Lucky of his meager sustenance by eating the 
scraps from Pozzo's chicken bones. Lucky responds soon thereafter with a 
sharp kick to his shin, and Estragon retaliates in the second act with an even 
more brutal beating of the fallen Lucky. At this point, there would seem to be 
little hope for solidarity among the disenfranchised, all of whom seem more 
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intent upon serving their own self-interests than in uniting to ease each oth-
er's suffering. 
However, act II does at least offer new opportunities for political engage-
ment. The mighty and the meek have both fallen, literally, since the now-
blind Pozzo and the now-mute Lucky no sooner return than they fall to the 
ground and can't get up. Vladimir sees the opportunity for altruism and 
delivers what sounds like a political manifesto: 
Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! [Pause. Vehemently.] Let us do 
something, while we have the chance! It is not every day that we are needed. 
[ ... ] To all man.kind they were addressed, those cries for help still ringing· in 
our ears! But at this place, at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether 
we like it or not. Let us represent worthily for once the foul brood to which a 
cruel fate consigned us! (74) 
The earnestness of the oration is undercut, however, by the action on stage. 
For, while Vladimir is speechifying about the need to assist the downtrodden, 
he is in fact delaying to do so, as Pozzo and Lucky continue to wriggle 
helplessly on the ground. When Didi and then Gogo fmally do attempt to 
lend a hand, their efforts fail spectacularly, resulting in their own downfall 
and their resentment toward those whom they sought to help. Again, the play 
would seem to testify against the viability of even the most humble attempts 
at political activism. 
Yet Vladimir's most poignant speech near the end of the play does suc-
ceed in offering a politically efficacious statement of principle. After Pozzo 
and Lucky exit and before the Boy enters to announce that no salvation will 
be forthcoming from Godot again today, Didi wonders, "Was I sleeping, 
while the others suffered? Am I sleeping now?" If one is attentive, he notes, 
it becomes clear that "The air is full of our cries. [He listens.] But habit is a 
great deadener" (84). At this moment in the play Estragon is physically 
asleep, but Vladimir acknowledges that they have both been lulled into an 
ethical torpor from which it is difficult to awake. No irony lightens this heart-
rending dark night of the soul in which Vladimir recognizes his role in a 
cautionazy tale, an example of how not to live, waiting in vain for salvation, 
sleep-walking through life, doing nothing. His most enigmatic line here is 
"habit is a great deadener." The sentiment is familiar to Beckett, first ex-
pressed in his early monograph on Proust. 7 What is unclear in this case is the 
antecedent. Which habit does Didi have in mind? The habit of living? The 
habit of waiting? Within the context of this speech, it seems more likely that 
he means the habit of ignoring the cries of others. The primazy shortcoming 
for which Didi faults himself is a failure of empathy, a failure to hear in the 
selfs cry of abjection the echoing cries of millions of other fellow sufferers. 
This is as close to a political credo as the play comes. Life is suffering, but 
one need not necessarily suffer alone. "To each man his little cross," muses 
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Vladimir (58), but Christ was uot crucified alone; he had the two thieves for 
company. Immeasurable abjection and shared trauma provide common 
ground, if for no better function than to plant ones cross alongside ones 
fellows. Beckett does not go so far as to profess any great faith that concerted 
political action will succeed in ameliorating misery-though neither does the 
recipient of the Croix de Guerre and the Medai/le de Resistance exclude that 
possibility. He offers no more or less than the hope ~a~ some useful go.od 
might come from hearing the cries of others and recogmzmg an affm1ty with 
ones own suffering. This modest proposal does not presume to cure the 
world's ills but it is the necessary first step in that direction. Furthermore, 
this basic p~litical principle ascribes some redemptive function to identifica-
tion other than as an irrational, oppressive process leading inexorably to the 
Gulag or the gas chamber. 
3. WAITING FOR FEMA: ENLISTING AND RESISTING THE 
POLITICAL MIRROR IN NEW ORLEANS 
The 2007 New Orleans production contributes instructively to this ongoing 
debate over the politics of identification. As related in the introduction, P~ul 
Chan's original inspiration to mount Waiting for Godot came from the strik-
ing siniilarities he noticed between the devastated Lower Ninth Ward and ~e 
set of Beckett's play. He did not see these correspondences as only working 
in one direction, however; he believed that New Orleans might have as much 
to teach Godot as Godot had to teach New Orleans: "In New Orleans in 2007, 
Godot is legion and it is not difficult to recognize the city through the play. 
Here the burden of the new is to realize the play through the city" (3). With 
so ~any ready-made affmities at hand, Chan chose not to select a local 
theater in which to stage the play, but rather to take the play directly to the 
people most affected by Hurricane Katrina, performing it on site amid the 
unreconstructed rubble. The play was also cast to accentuate affinities with 
its audience. Vladimir was played by prominent African-American actor 
Wendell Pierce, best known for his role on HBO's The Wire, "whose parents 
once lived in the neighborhood, not far from where the play was staged" 
(Brown). Lucky was played by Mark McLaughlin, the only white actor 
among the principles and a "local theater veterau" (Giselson). Chan clainied 
that his goal in all of these creative decisions was "to enter and engage the 
myriad dimensions of life lived in the midst of ruin, without. succumbing t~ 
the easy graces ofreducing it to either knowledge or illustralion of that hfe 
(3). Caveats nqtwithstanding, the belief that Waiting for Godot and post-
Katrina New Orleans had an intiniate mirror-relation with one another was a 
core conviction of the project from its genesis, a conviction shared by the 
dozens of collaborators and generally reaffirmed by the play's reception. 
The Politics of Identification in Waiting/or Godot 15 
Upon closer examination, however, it seems that not everyone saw the same 
reflection when Godot held up its mirror to deciniated nature in New Or-
leans. 
The production's riskiest move was to unmoor the play from the stage, 
performing the first weekend's shows at a crossroads in the Lower Ninth 
Ward and the second weekend's shows at a storm-ruined house in Gentilly. 8 
Yet by all accounts this creative gamble paid off, yielding sublinie new 
significance from several moments in the play. The British journalist Ethan 
Brown noted the chilling relevance of a line like Vladimir's "Where are all 
these corpses from?" ( 60), in a neighborhood where human remains were 
still being discovered among the rubble. The flood-ravaged landscape also 
added sharp poignancy to Didi and Gogo's exchange early in the second act: 
VLADIMIR: Do you not recognize the place? 
ES1RAGON: [Suddenly furious.] Recognize! What is there to recognize? All 
my lousy life I've crawled about in the mud! And you talk to me about 
scenery! [Looking wildly about him.] Look at this muckheap! I've never stirred 
from it! ( 57) 
Not only the impotent fury but also the precise descriptive details of Gogo's 
diatribe rang all too true for local audience members. The director, Christo-
pher McElroen of the Classical Theatre of Harlem, siniilarly exploited the 
ready-made mise-en-scene of the environmental setting to full advantage. 
David Cuthbert of the Times-Picayune compliniented the production for 
making "great use of the broad canvas at hand, in spatial relations, stumbling 
forays into the weeds and the dramatic entrance and exit that two trees in the 
distance on North Prieur Street provide" (Cuthbert). He added that the 
chance creative interventions of the environment itself occasionally worked 
to serendipitous effect: "as a bonus, tugboats from the Industrial Canal pro-
vide haunting echoes" (Cuthbert). The city effectively served as both set 
designer and sound technician for the production. Covering the event for the 
online magazine NOLAFugees.com, Anne Giselson reported, "The sound-
scape was just as integral: distant police sirens, tugboat and train horns [and] 
some sharply wailing birds, all pulsing quietly in the background, muted by 
the once treacherous canal and surrounding empty lots of former homes." 
Occasionally the script was altered slightly to account for the site-specific 
realities of this unique setting; indeed, any director would have been derelict 
in his duties to have bypassed such exquisite opportunities. For instance, 
when the tramps first attempt to orient themselves to their surroundings, Didi 
alludes to a bog as reference point: 
VLADIMIR: [Looking around.] You recognize the place? 
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ES1RAGON: I didn't say that. 
VLADIMIR: Well? 
ESTRAGON: That makes no difference. 
VLADIMIR: All the same ... that tree ... [Turning towards the auditor-
ium] ... that bog. (16) 
In the New Orleans production, "that bog" was revised to ''that levee." More 
importantly, the physical orientation of the reference was reversed. Instead of 
making comical metatheatical reference to the audience as a bog, Wendell 
Pierce's Vladimir turned ominously backward toward the levee, whose 
breach had so recently unleashed the deadly flood in that very neighborhood. 
As Giselson observed, "This tiny change shifts attention away from the audi-
ence to the levee, our ubiquitous symbol offailure." Giselson testifies to the 
profound cumulative effect of these seemingly minor alterations: "The set 
never lets you forget either-whenever Estragon sat exhaustedly at the base 
of that north leaning pole, that stuck storm compass, my heart nearly broke." 
For all the searing emotional power unanimously attributed to the produc-
tion, reactions were mixed when it came to the cultural and political value of 
this Godot. Chan's emphasis upon collaboration with the locals-residents, 
community organizers, theater practitioners, journalists, and educators-
seems to have been earnest from the start. His establishment of a "shadow 
fund" for relief efforts further proved his commitment to "pitch in and do 
something" with a lasting and tangible positive impact in the region. This 
spirit of solidarity proved contagious in certain quarters, rejuvenating many 
spectators with a surge of civic pride, as if attendance itself constituted an 
ennobling political act of community rebuilding. In David Cuthbert' s glow-
ing review, for instance, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between his 
praise of the play and his praise of the courageous New Orleans audience 
seated transfixed before its mirror: "This is Beckett's merciless, tragic-comic 
view of mankind, playing at life to avoid the specter of death, awaiting an 
enlightenment that stubbornly refuses to appear. But man, being what he is, 
will pin his hopes to something as ephemeral as two leaves sprouting from an 
otherwise barren tree. If that's not us, I don't know what is." To borrow 
Sontag's formulation, it would seem that Waitingfor Godot is written for and 
about New Orleans. Cuthbert all but says as much when he concludes, "This 
is stimulating, adventurous theater of the first order in which we see our-
selves in the mirror of a great play." Viewed from the vantage point of 
identification, the play is most deserving of praise precisely when it most 
resembles the lives of its audience, and vice versa. 
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Not every spectator was as enamored as Cuthbert with the images re-
flected by the New Orleans spectacle. Rather than finding a model for politi-
cal solidarity, Aune Giselson found social inequality still evident in the limit-
ed accessibility to this "free" performance: 
What felt most "Nawlins" to me was that while hundreds of us stood arolllld in 
line for a ticket, some for over an hour, joking around, grumbling, spraying 
ourselves with the free mosquito repellent, VIPs with lanyards sailed past us, 
as did some neighborhood residents who tried to argue that they'd lived there 
their whole lives and they shouldn't have to wait. 
Embedded within the withering sarcasm of this complaint is actually a very 
serious corrective. As its postmodern detractors rightly recognize, identifica-
tion harbors a dangerous tendency for overgeneralization, blanching out the 
heterogeneity of a group and replacing it with a homogenous fa9ade of 
pseudo-unity. "The danger is in the neatness of identifications," cautioned 
the young Samuel Beckett in "Dante ... Bruno . Vico .. Joyce" (19). Gisel-
son's behind-the-scene's reportage provides a timely reminder of the real 
tensions that continued to divide certain members of her audience from one 
another, a disparity that applies to almost any given audience viewing any 
given play. The "we" of Cuthbert's ''we see ourselves in the mirror of a great 
play" sounds a bit too neat and aspirational in light of Giselson's grum-
blings-especially when one factors in Ethan Brown's report that 400 attend-
ees without passes were turned away from the opening night's overcrowded 
performance. In other words, the only "we" reflected by Godot on that partic-
ular night were those fortunate enough to obtain an exclusive seat before its 
mirror. The overwhelming popularity of the production was a great affirma-
tion of Chan's project, yet the existing tensions exacerbated before the show 
indicated the real obstacles to achieving any kind of "Big Easy" solidarity 
after the show. Clearly the image Cuthbert saw reflected "in the mirror of a 
great play" conflicted sharply with the parallax view Giselson saw reflected 
in the glare of the VIP lanyards. 
Despite their markedly different interpretations of the spectacle surround-
ing Godot, these divergent "Nawlins" reporters both found sustaining politi-
cal inspiration from the play itself. Cuthbert observed, "There is no great 
entity riding to our rescue to 'fix' what has been broken. We must do it 
ourselves, as we have, with the help of compassionate strangers and our own 
crazy courage." Giselson was even more outspoken about the message of 
self-determination: · 
There's already been a whole lot written about the connection of the play to 
the city's current state of affairs, emphasizing the idea of New Orleanians 
"waiting." Waiting for FE:MA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], 
waiting for Road Home money, waiting for neighbors, waiting for a master 
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ing Godot, these divergent "Nawlins" reporters both found sustaining politi-
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ourselves, as we have, with the help of compassionate strangers and our own 
crazy courage." Giselson was even more outspoken about the message of 
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There's already been a whole lot written about the connection of the play to 
the city's current state of affairs, emphasizing the idea of New Orleanians 
"waiting." Waiting for FE:MA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], 
waiting for Road Home money, waiting for neighbors, waiting for a master 
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plan, etc. This, I imagine unintentionally, emphasizes a certain passivity to the 
reconstruction that mischaracterizes the enormous, historic, exhausting 
amount of civic activity down here. I've never seen the town so goddamned 
busy, so many sunken eyes and jittery nerves and bleeping blackberries and 
calloused hands. In fact, many, many people did not wait and are not waiting, 
paralyzed, for government help, but rather are moving forward and doing. 
Giselson may resist the "we" classification which would conflate her with 
the VIPs in the front row, but she proudly embraces civic identification with 
her neighbors on the back bench when it comes to sharing abjection and 
working together to ameliorate it. Those who would read Waiting for Godot 
as a protest letter to the despot du jour or as a conscription letter for the next 
messiah misidentify the target audience. The play was never addressed to 
those in power or to any would-be savior, but rather to the disempowered 
who, through the empathy sometimes demonstrated by Didi and Gogo, and 
through the solidarity of action conspicuously declined by them, might actu-
ally help one another affect change for the better. 
Jon Erickson argues that Godot guides its audiences to distinguish be-
tween cosmic misfortune and social injustice: "What is at issue is a matter of 
separating questions of social justice-what we can change-from feelings 
about cosmic justice-what we cannot. If we do not do this, if we do not 
accept that there is 'nothing to be done' in relation to cosmic justice, then the 
'what is to be done' of social justice will never be realized" (271 ). To apply 
this litmus test to New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina must qualify as a cosmic 
misfortune, something that neither the residents of New Orleans nor their 
government could avoid. People devastated by the storm might instinctively 
consider this disaster to be unfair. However, such a response confuses mis-
fortune with injustice, premised as it is upon the misguided assumption that 
the universe operates according to principles of fairness. Nevertheless, the 
charge of injustice may indeed accurately pertain to the inept governmental 
response to the disaster, in which case there is "something to be done" other 
than passively accept the situation. When Estragon opens Godot with the 
observation that there is "Nothing to be done" (11 ), one might well accept 
this assessment as a cosmic concession to the inevitability of suffering in 
every human life. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to accept his 
passive resignation when he and Vladimir inspect Lucky's wounds. Observ-
ing the "running sore" on the servant's neck, they reason, 
ESTRAGON: It's the rope. 
VLADIMIR: It's the rubbing. 
ESTRAGON: It's inevitable. (26) 
The Politics of Identification in Waiting/or Godot 19 
Well, perhaps a sore is the inevitable outcome of incessant rubbing from a 
rope, but placing a rope around a man's neck and tightening it like a noose 
and leading him around like an abused beast of burden is by no means 
inevitable. It is injustice, committed by the powerful (Pozzo) against the 
powerless (the most unlucky Lucky), a crime that demands a political act of 
rectification (emancipation). Not surprisingly, this lesson is lost entirely upon 
the perpetrator Pozzo, who waxes, "The tears of the world are a constant 
quantity" (33)--which is merely a more lyrical way of saying "Nothing to be 
done." Those in power inflict suffering upon the disenfranchised, through 
sheer incompetence as often as through premeditated malice, and they have 
and will always rationalize these injustices as unavoidable misfortune. 
But: Didi and Gogo should know better. From a political standpoint, 
Waiting for Godot is less an indictment of the Pozzos and George W. Bushs 
of the world for their bungling abuses, or of the Godots and Bill Clintons of 
the world for failing to arrive and save the day, than it is an expose of 
political failure at the grass roots. Didi and Gogo know firsthand what it feels 
like to be beaten, to go hungry, to suffer inexorably at the hands of cosmic 
forces beyond ones control, but also to suffer unnecessarily at the hands of 
social forces that could be resisted. The disempowered in this play outnum-
ber the powerful three to one, and had they exercised the wherewithal to 
work in solidarity, they might have gained strength from these numbers to 
ameliorate some of their suffering. After all, volunteers in the French Resis-
tance determined that something could be done, or at least ought to be at-
tempted, and, impossibly, they did it. Yet the slaves in Godot bicker at one 
another instead of uniting to turn their righteous protest against the forces 
that oppress them, some of which (though not all) might be resisted. When 
Didi confesses late in the play to becoming deadened to the cries of others, he 
essentially convicts himself of the same "massive failure of political nerve" 
with which Eagleton charges the postmodern intelligentsia (233). 
While the play presents political failure, it is not inevitable that its audi-
ences will mirror that failure. Just because Didi and Gogo famously do not 
move at the end of the play, this does not condemn audiences to replicate 
their immobility. Those producers who look to Waiting for Godot for a 
program in how to solve the perennial problem of human suffering are apt to 
be disappointed. Likewise, those who seek to appropriate the play as a politi-
cal protest against local tyrants or epic fools, or as a public plea for the 
intervention of a political savior, are sure to find that their appointed puppet 
resists the voice of the ventriloquist. Waiting/or Godot is a play about tramps 
addressed to tramps. To the extent that it mirrors the condition of those 
tramps on the other side of the footlights (or Sarajevan candle lights, or New 
Orleanian street lights) it reflects not a model for political resistance but a 
model for political failure. Nevertheless, in exposing that failure as such, 
Waiting for Godot may invite the spectator to grimace at the image of herself 
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she sees reflected in the play. If so, then this quintessential play about failure, 
apathy, paralysis, and abjection might be effectively enlisted as a cautionary 
tale inspiring political mobilization quite different than the inaction mirrored 
by the play. 
NOTES 
1. See www.creativetime.org for production photos as well as detailed descriptions of the 
mission, performances, participants, off-shoot projects, and support services associated with 
the New Orleans Waitingfor Godot. 
2. The reprieve would not prove permanent. In January 2011, the Beckett estite abruptly 
withdrew its permission for the post-Katrina Godot, shutting down a scheduled production at 
the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and thus forcing director Christopher McElroen to 
cancel a tour of the production. See Mark Shanahan and Meredith Goldstein, "No More 'Wait-
ing,"' Boston Globe (25 January 2011), online at www.boston.com/ae/celebrity/articles/2011/ 
01/25/no _more_ waiting/ For information about several highly acclaimed performances of the 
McElroen production before the Beckett estate's sudden reversal, see 
www.christophermcelroen.com/waiting-for-godot-tour. 
3. For a fuller discussion of my reservations about purist protection of Beckett's work, see 
the final chapter of Graley Herren, Samuel Beckett's Plays on Film and Televison (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
4. The most notorious example is JoAnne Akalaitis' American Repertory Theater produc-
tion of Endgame. For illuminating discussions of this controversy, see Akalaitis' interviews in 
Jonathan Kalb, Beckett in Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989 (165-172); and Lois 
Oppenheim (ed.),Directing Beckett, Ann Arbor: U ofMichiganP, 1994 (135-140). 
5. It is worth noting that Bosnians remain highly appreciative of Sontag's political efforts 
on their behalf, regardless of the debatable artistic merits of her production. In April 2009, 
Bosnian officials announced that a city square in the center of Sarajevo would be renamed 
Theatre Place-Susan Sontag in honor of the late activist. 
6. See Jacques Lacan, ''The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function, as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience," Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Bruce Fink, New York: W.W. Norton, 
2002 (3-9). 
7. Beckett praises Proust's artistic exploitation of involuntary memory, as opposed to 
voluntary memory which he dismisses as lifeless habit and thus anathema to art: "The man with 
a good memory does not remember anything because he does not forget anything. His memory 
is uniform, a creature of routine, at once a condition and function of his impeccable habit, an 
instrument of reference instead of an instrument of discovery" ( 17). 
8. The Lower Ninth productions took place on November 2-4, 2007, at the intersection of 
Reynes and North Prieur Streets. Because the crowds vastly exceeded the 600-seat amphithea-
tre, the original Friday-Saturday run was extended to a third show on Sunday. The Gentilly 
productions took place on November 9-10, 2007, at 6205 Warrington Drive. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Beckett, Samuel. "Dante ... Bruno. Vico ... Joyce." 1929. Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a 
Dramatic Fragment. Ed. Ruby Cohn. New York: Grove Press, 1984. 19-34. Print. 
---.Proust. 1931. New York: Grove Press, 1957. Print. 
---.Waiting/of Godot. The Cof1Jplete Dramatic Works. London: Faber and Faber, 1986. 7-
88. 
Brown, Ethan. "The lower ninth ward meets Samuel Beckett." Guardian Unlimited (12 No-
vember 2007). Online at: http://arts.guardian.co.uk/theatre/news/story/0,.2209888,00.html 
(consulted I February 2010). Web. 
The Politics of Identification in Waiting/or Godot 21 
Chan, Paul. "Waiting for Godot in New OrleanS: An Artist's Statement." The Becke.tt Circle I 
LeCercledeBeckett31.1(2008):1-3. Print. 
Creative Time. Online at: www.creativetime.org (consulted 1 February 2010). Web. 
Cuthbert, David. "Godot Is Great." Times-Picayune (6 November 2007). Online at: http:// 
blog.nola.com/living/2007 /11/godot_is _great/ (consulted 1 February 2010). Web. 
Diamond, Elin. "Re: Blau, Butler, Beckett, and the Politics of Seeming." TDR 44.4 (2000): 31-
43. Print. 
Eagleton, Terry. Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell. 2009. Print. 
Erickson, Jon. "Is Nothing To Be Done?" Modern Drama 50.2 (2007): 258-75. Print. 
Gisleson, Anne. ''That Tree, That Levee." NOLAFugees.com (November 2007): 1-5. Online at: 
http://nolafugees.com/NF/ (consulted I February 2010). Web. 
Herren, Graley. Samuel Beckett's Plays ori Film and Television. Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2007. Print. 
Kalb, Jonathan. Beckett in Peiformance. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. Print. 
Lacan, Jacques. "The fyfirror Stage as Formative of the !Function, as Revealed in Psychoana-
lytic Experience." Ecrits: A Selection. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. 
3-9. Print. 
Oppenheim, Lois, ed. Directing Beckett. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994. Print. 
---. "Playing with Beckett's Plays: On Sontag in Sarajevo and Other Directorial Infidel-
ities." Journal of Beckett Studies 4.2 (1998): 35-46. Print. 
Shanahan, Mark and Meredith Goldstein. "No More 'Waiting."' Boston Globe (25 January 
2011 ). Online at http://www.boston.com/ae/celebrity/articles/2011/01/25/no _more_ waiting/ 
(consulted 28 January 2011). Web. 
Sontag, Susan. "Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo." 1993. Reprinted in Where the Stress Falls. 
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001. 299-322. Print. 
"Waiting for Godot (National Tour)." Online at www.christophenncelroen.com/waiting-for-
godot-tour (consulted 28 January 2011). Web. 
20 Chapter I 
she sees reflected in the play. If so, then this quintessential play about failure, 
apathy, paralysis, and abjection might be effectively enlisted as a cautionary 
tale inspiring political mobilization quite different than the inaction mirrored 
by the play. 
NOTES 
1. See www.creativetime.org for production photos as well as detailed descriptions of the 
mission, performances, participants, off-shoot projects, and support services associated with 
the New Orleans Waitingfor Godot. 
2. The reprieve would not prove permanent. In January 2011, the Beckett estite abruptly 
withdrew its permission for the post-Katrina Godot, shutting down a scheduled production at 
the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and thus forcing director Christopher McElroen to 
cancel a tour of the production. See Mark Shanahan and Meredith Goldstein, "No More 'Wait-
ing,"' Boston Globe (25 January 2011), online at www.boston.com/ae/celebrity/articles/2011/ 
01/25/no _more_ waiting/ For information about several highly acclaimed performances of the 
McElroen production before the Beckett estate's sudden reversal, see 
www.christophermcelroen.com/waiting-for-godot-tour. 
3. For a fuller discussion of my reservations about purist protection of Beckett's work, see 
the final chapter of Graley Herren, Samuel Beckett's Plays on Film and Televison (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
4. The most notorious example is JoAnne Akalaitis' American Repertory Theater produc-
tion of Endgame. For illuminating discussions of this controversy, see Akalaitis' interviews in 
Jonathan Kalb, Beckett in Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989 (165-172); and Lois 
Oppenheim (ed.),Directing Beckett, Ann Arbor: U ofMichiganP, 1994 (135-140). 
5. It is worth noting that Bosnians remain highly appreciative of Sontag's political efforts 
on their behalf, regardless of the debatable artistic merits of her production. In April 2009, 
Bosnian officials announced that a city square in the center of Sarajevo would be renamed 
Theatre Place-Susan Sontag in honor of the late activist. 
6. See Jacques Lacan, ''The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function, as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience," Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Bruce Fink, New York: W.W. Norton, 
2002 (3-9). 
7. Beckett praises Proust's artistic exploitation of involuntary memory, as opposed to 
voluntary memory which he dismisses as lifeless habit and thus anathema to art: "The man with 
a good memory does not remember anything because he does not forget anything. His memory 
is uniform, a creature of routine, at once a condition and function of his impeccable habit, an 
instrument of reference instead of an instrument of discovery" ( 17). 
8. The Lower Ninth productions took place on November 2-4, 2007, at the intersection of 
Reynes and North Prieur Streets. Because the crowds vastly exceeded the 600-seat amphithea-
tre, the original Friday-Saturday run was extended to a third show on Sunday. The Gentilly 
productions took place on November 9-10, 2007, at 6205 Warrington Drive. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Beckett, Samuel. "Dante ... Bruno. Vico ... Joyce." 1929. Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a 
Dramatic Fragment. Ed. Ruby Cohn. New York: Grove Press, 1984. 19-34. Print. 
---.Proust. 1931. New York: Grove Press, 1957. Print. 
---.Waiting/of Godot. The Cof1Jplete Dramatic Works. London: Faber and Faber, 1986. 7-
88. 
Brown, Ethan. "The lower ninth ward meets Samuel Beckett." Guardian Unlimited (12 No-
vember 2007). Online at: http://arts.guardian.co.uk/theatre/news/story/0,.2209888,00.html 
(consulted I February 2010). Web. 
The Politics of Identification in Waiting/or Godot 21 
Chan, Paul. "Waiting for Godot in New OrleanS: An Artist's Statement." The Becke.tt Circle I 
LeCercledeBeckett31.1(2008):1-3. Print. 
Creative Time. Online at: www.creativetime.org (consulted 1 February 2010). Web. 
Cuthbert, David. "Godot Is Great." Times-Picayune (6 November 2007). Online at: http:// 
blog.nola.com/living/2007 /11/godot_is _great/ (consulted 1 February 2010). Web. 
Diamond, Elin. "Re: Blau, Butler, Beckett, and the Politics of Seeming." TDR 44.4 (2000): 31-
43. Print. 
Eagleton, Terry. Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell. 2009. Print. 
Erickson, Jon. "Is Nothing To Be Done?" Modern Drama 50.2 (2007): 258-75. Print. 
Gisleson, Anne. ''That Tree, That Levee." NOLAFugees.com (November 2007): 1-5. Online at: 
http://nolafugees.com/NF/ (consulted I February 2010). Web. 
Herren, Graley. Samuel Beckett's Plays ori Film and Television. Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2007. Print. 
Kalb, Jonathan. Beckett in Peiformance. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. Print. 
Lacan, Jacques. "The fyfirror Stage as Formative of the !Function, as Revealed in Psychoana-
lytic Experience." Ecrits: A Selection. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. 
3-9. Print. 
Oppenheim, Lois, ed. Directing Beckett. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994. Print. 
---. "Playing with Beckett's Plays: On Sontag in Sarajevo and Other Directorial Infidel-
ities." Journal of Beckett Studies 4.2 (1998): 35-46. Print. 
Shanahan, Mark and Meredith Goldstein. "No More 'Waiting."' Boston Globe (25 January 
2011 ). Online at http://www.boston.com/ae/celebrity/articles/2011/01/25/no _more_ waiting/ 
(consulted 28 January 2011). Web. 
Sontag, Susan. "Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo." 1993. Reprinted in Where the Stress Falls. 
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001. 299-322. Print. 
"Waiting for Godot (National Tour)." Online at www.christophenncelroen.com/waiting-for-
godot-tour (consulted 28 January 2011). Web. 
